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The	 management	 and	 economic	 literature	 points	 out	that	 the	most	 valuable	 strategic	 resource	 for	 firms	 in	
the	21st	century	may	no	longer	be	physical	assets	such	as	
land,	 factories	or	machines,	as	was	 the	case	at	 the	begin-
ning	of	 the	20th	 century,	 but	 rather	 intangible	 assets	 such	









forced	 the	strategic	 importance	of	 technological	expertise	
and	the	ability	of	firms	to	both	develop	and	leverage	their	
technology	 base	 via	 innovative	 activities.	 Companies	 are	
under	pressure	to	learn,	create	and	update	new	technologi-
cal	 competencies,	 while	 unlearning	 obsolete	 knowledge	
and	know	how.
The	 creation	 of	 new	 technological	 know-how	 and	
knowledge	 to	 develop	 new	 products	 and	 processes	 (and/
or	to	improve	existing	ones)	is	supposed	to	give	the	inno-
vating	 company	 a	 competitive	 edge	 on	 the	 market.	 This	
often	 necessitates	 considerable	 investments.	 However,	








generated	 exceeds	 or	 at	 least	 equals	 the	marginal	 cost	 of	







Discussions	 on	 how	 companies	 can	 exclude	 cur-
rent	and	potential	competitors	 from	using	 their	 intangible	
achievements	 in	 the	field	of	 technological	 innovation	has	
résumé
Cet	article	est	consacré	aux	marques	comme	
moyen	 de	 compléter	 les	 brevets	 pour	








l’importance	 de	 la	marque	 va	 aller	 crois-
sante.	Quand	une	révolution	technologique	
sonnera	 la	fin	de	 cycle,	 la	marque	pourra	
opérer	 comme	 un	 bouclier	 pour	 aider	
l’entreprise	 maintenant	 établie	 à	 survivre	
au	changement.




This	 paper	 deals	 with	 brand	 equity	 as	 a	
way	to	complement	patents	and	other	tech-
nological	 assets	 in	 technology	 intensive	
industries.	The	longitudinal	case	of	Bayer	
Aspirin	 is	 presented.	The	 discussion	 sug-
gests	 that	 while	 Hi-tech	 start-ups	 build	 a	
competitive	 advantage	 through	 techno-
logy,	 they	 can	 also	 use	 this	 early	 period	
to	build	significant	brand	equity	at	limited	
marketing	costs.	 In	 turn	 this	brand	equity	
may	 become	 increasingly	 important	 as	
the	 technology	 life-cycle	 unfolds.	 When	
the	 next	 technological	 revolution	 strikes,	
brands	may	 serve	 as	 a	 shield	 to	 help	 the	
now	well-established	firms	survive	through	
the	change.
Keywords:	 Brands,	 patents,	 technological	
innovation,	 interdependencies,	 life	 cycle,	
protection	of	innovation,	aspirin
resumen
Este	 artículo	 se	 consagra	 a	 las	 marcas	
como	 medio	 de	 completar	 las	 patentes	
para	 extraer	 los	 ingresos	 esperados	 de	 la	
innovación.	 Se	 presenta	 y	 se	 discute	 el	
caso	 longitudinal	de	 la	aspirina	de	Bayer.	








escudo	 para	 ayudar	 a	 la	 empresa	 (ahora	
establecida)	a	sobrevivir	al	cambio.
Palabras	claves:	marcas,	patentes,	innova-
ción	 tecnológica,	 interdependencias,	 ciclo	
de	vida,	protección	de	la	innovación,	aspi-
rina
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so	 far	predominantly	 focused	on	 legal	 rights	 such	as	pat-
ents.	However,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 for	 the	protec-
tion	 of	 intangible	 technological	 assets	 show	 considerable	
shortcomings	–	and	particularly	so	for	patents.	Mansfield,	





















In	Hi-tech	 industries,	 it	may	 sound	 intuitively	 logical	
to	count	primarily	on	technology	assets	to	protect	techno-
logical	innovation	and	this	is	often	regarded	as	conventional	
wisdom.	The	whole	point	of	our	paper	 is	 to	question	 this	
belief.	In	so	doing,	we	address	what	we	see	as	a	gap	in	the	
literature,	 i.e.	 the	 silence	on	 the	 role	 of	 brands	 and	other	
market-based	assets	 (such	as	 logos	or	control	of	distribu-
tion	channels)	potentially	complementing	patents	and	other	
technology-based	 assets	 to	 protect	 technological	 innova-





Brand	 equity1	 is	 increasingly	 recognized	 as	 a	 corpo-
rate	 asset	 of	 utmost	 strategic	 importance.	 Single	 brands	
can	 attain	market	 values	 of	 a	multiple	 of	 the	 companies’	




of	 brands	 for	 technology	 intensive	firms.	As	 a	 result,	 the	
literature	 remains	 somewhat	 silent	 about	 the	 interactions	








time.	More	 specifically,	we	 adopt	 the	perspective	of	 evo-
lutionary	economics,	with	Dosi‘s	technological	trajectories	


















nology	helped	 the	 innovating	firm	build	a	brand-to-be,	 at	
minimal	 cost.	 (The	name	of	 the	 company	was	 frequently	
associated	to	the	technology	concept,	thus	providing	some	
form	of	 a	buzz	 in	 the	 communities	of	 “techies”.	 In	 addi-
tion,	 the	 technologically-advanced	 distribution	 channels	
tended	 to	 promote	 the	 new	 offerings	 as	 a	 way	 to	 differ-









to	 imitation.	 The	 early	 innovator(s)	 may	 still	 try	 invest-
ing	 in	research	and	 technological	development	but	at	 that	
stage,	the	best	barrier	against	competition	are	likely	to	be	
the	market-based	assets	(brands,	reputation,	control	of	dis-
tribution	channels,	design,	 logo,	etc.).	Along	 the	way,	 the	
















customer	 base	while	 running	 behind	 the	 train	 to	 develop	
and/or	acquire	the	new	technology.




needed	 to	 document	 this	 model	 empirically.	 In	 addition,	
we	hoped	that	another	case	study	would	help	us	gain	some	
insight	 into	 how	 the	 complementarities	 and	mutual	 inter-
dependencies	between	technology-based	and	market-based	
assets	operate	over	time.	This	is	where	we	intend	to	bring	
a	 contribution	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 that	we	 identified	 in	 the	
literature.
Our	 interest	 for	 this	 line	 of	 thinking	was	 in	 fact	 trig-
gered	 by	 examples	 of	 companies	 that	managed	 to	 secure	
strong	market	positions	on	some	technological	innovations	
long	after	the	patents	had	expired,	even	when	the	techno-
logical	 knowledge	had	 spread	over	 to	 competitors.	These	




















Spread of technology, product 
sales, # of competitors

























cycle	per se.	We	are	 indebted	 to	one	of	 the	anonymous	 reviewers	 for	
pointing	this	out.	







the	 key	 driver).	 The	 second	 objective	 of	 our	 research	 is	
to	 open	 a	 research	 agenda	 by	 “identifying	 suspects”,	 i.e.	
what	 additional	 independent	 variable(s)	 may	 contribute	
to	 explain	how	 some	firms	 successfully	 secure	 the	 return	







This	 set	 of	 three	 objectives	 logically	 led	 us	 to	 a	 case	
study	 approach,	Yin	 (1994).	Although	 this	 paper	 focuses	
on	 a	 single	 case	 study,	 the	 research	 project	 was	 actually	
made	of	two	parallel	independent	case	studies.	The	results	
of	the	two	case	studies	tended	to	reinforce	each	other,	both	
questioning	 the	 traditional	 purely	 technological	 view	 and	
identifying	market-based	 assets	 (typically	 brands	 in	 both	
studies)	 as	 a	 reasonable	candidate	 to	explain	at	 least	part	
of	what	we	observed.	In	addition,	both	studies	led	to	a	pre-






the	 late	 1890’s	 with	 a	 remarkably	 useful	 new	 drug,	 and	




that	 saw	Bayer	 lose	 the	 legal	 rights	over	 the	product,	 the	
patents	and	even	the	brand	names,	before	they	managed	to	
regain	control	of	these	rights.
The	 data	 used	 are	 secondary	 data	 that	were	 gathered	
from	 published	 accounts	 of	 the	 history	 of	Bayer	 and	 the	
aspirin	(Alstaedter,	R.	1997;	Bayer	1983	and	1996;	Bohle,	
F.	1988;	Kohl,	F.	1997;	Mann,	C.	C.	and	M.	L.	Plummer,	








model	 to	confront	with	 the	data	stemming	 from	 the	aspi-
rin	 case.	 Instead,	we	wrote	 a	first	 version	of	 the	 story	of	
the	aspirin	at	Bayer	as	a	case	study	 report,	with	no	other	









chose	 to	complement	 the	 initial	version	of	 the	case	study	
by systematically introducing inserts (in italics) in the text 
of the case study. These inserts aim at discussing the issue 
of both technological assets and market based assets. This 
is done along the way, as the story unfolds.	On	that	basis,	
after	having	confirmed	from	the	case	study	that	technologi-
cal	 assets	 fell	 short	 of	 explaining	 our	 data	 satisfactorily,	
after	having	identified	and	documented	the	important	role	
played	 by	market-based	 assets,	we	finally	 came	 out	with	





The Case of Bayer Aspirin
Bayer	AG	was	established	in	1863	by	Friedrich	Bayer	and	
Johan	Weskott,	 starting	 as	 one	 of	 the	 early	 German	 dye	
companies	which	successfully	extracted	natural	dyes	dur-
ing	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Around	1880,	
Bayer	 AG	 experienced	 an	 economic	 downturn	 because	
competitors	were	able	 to	circumnavigate	existing	patents.	
This	was	primarily	due	to	a	peculiarity	of	the	German	pat-
ent	 law	that	made	it	possible	for	 inventors	 to	protect	pro-
duction	processes	but	not	products	themselves.	As	a	result,	
Bayer	chose	 to	diversify	away	 from	 the	dyestuff	 industry	
and	decided	to	expand	into	pharmaceuticals.
•	The	Innovation:	Acetylsalicylic	Acid	(ASA)













unexploited	 because	 of	 Gerhard’s	 early	 death.	 Building	
on	Gerhard’s	 work,	 Hermann	Kolbe	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Marburg	was	able	in	1859	to	synthesise	pure	salicylic	acid.	
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Heyden,	 a	 scholar	 of	 Kolbe,	 subsequently	 improved	 the	
production	 process,	 allowing	 for	 large-scale	 production	
at	 considerably	 reduced	 costs.	As	 a	 result,	 salicylic	 acid	
became	commonly	used	for	the	treatment	of	infections	and	
rheumatism.	 The	 product	 however	 tasted	 bad,	 provoked	
nausea,	and	could	cause	the	decomposition	of	the	lining	of	




the	 pharmaceutical	 department	 at	 Bayer,	 was	 asked	 to	
search	 for	 a	 drug	 similar	 to	 salicylic	 acid	but	with	 lesser	




could	be	 the	product	he	was	 looking	 for	 to	 substitute	 for	




1997;	Schreiner,	 1999;	Zündorf,	 2001).	Hoffman	had	 the	
intuition	 that	ASA	might	 be	 further	 purified	 to	 avoid	 the	
undesirable	 side	 effects.	 He	 tried	 to	 apply	 to	ASA	 exist-
ing	 methods	 of	 refining	 pharmaceuticals.	 He	 succeeded	
in	 doing	 so	 on	 October	 10,	 1897.	 He	 thus	 subsequently	
described	a	method	of	producing	a	pure	and	durable	form	
of	 acetylsalicylic	 acid	 (ASA).	What	 was	 to	 become	 the	
future	Bayer	aspirin	was	born.	
We see here an initial R&D investment made by Bayer. 
This R&D effort benefitted from earlier work conducted 
elsewhere. In the process, Bayer captured external knowl-
edge and built internal technological assets from a combi-
nation of pre-existing knowledge gathered from the outside 
plus in-house capabilities. This led to a new technological 
development that resulted in a major advancement of tech-
nology. Note that the product (ASA) was not new, nor was 
the process that was essentially borrowed from Kraut and 
existing refining methods.









previous	 drugs	 (e.g.	 Phenacetin	 and	Heroin).	They	 intro-
duced	a	brand-name:	Aspirin.	The	name	represents	a	com-
position	 of	 the	 Latin	 name	 for	 bark	 “Spiraea”	 (from	 the	
Greek	“Speiron”)	and	the	‘A’	standing	for	Acetyl.	In	1899,	
two	 years	 after	 Hoffmann’s	 invention,	 Bayer	 applied	 for	
trademark	protection	for	Aspirin	in	Germany	and	the	US.	
This	was	easily	obtained	due	to	the	name’s	genuine	nature	
and	 this	was	 extended	 internationally	 in	1906	 (Schreiner,	
1999)	3.
This is where the dynamics of the Aspirin story bifur-
cates. Right from the beginning, the technological inno-
vation developed at Bayer was not novel enough to be 
fully protectable by a patent. The conditions in which the 
technological innovation had emerged meant that Bayer 
needed other forms of protection than patents. (This justi-
fies our lengthy description of the context of emergence of 
the innovation). In sharp contrast, the apparently insignifi-
cant move consisting of choosing a brand-name and filing 
a trademark for it turned out to prepare what we are about 
to see, namely decades of rent extraction by Bayer on the 
Aspirin business. 
















Cross	 and	 the	 packaging	 clearly	 showed	 both	Bayer	 and	
Aspirin	names.	As	a	result,	end-consumers	of	Aspirin	tab-
lets	started	becoming	familiar	with	the	trademark.	
Several	 serious	 influenza	 epidemics	 in	 Europe	within	
the	early	years	of	the	20th	century	provided	an	unexpected	






made	 the	 drug	 and	 its	 merits	 known	 to	 a	 vast	 majority	
of	 Europeans	 and	 North	 Americans	 (Alstaedter,	 1997).	




idly	 built	 international	 recognition	 and	Aspirin	 became	 a	
3.	 In	our	discussion,	 the	name	Bayer	Aspirin	 is	used	 to	 represent	all	
Aspirin	brands	of	Bayer	 in	 the	various	national	and	regional	markets,	
e.g.,	Aspirinia,	Bayaspirina,	or	Aspirine	du	Rhône.
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word	used	daily	in	many	households	throughout	the	world	
(Bohle,	 1988).	This	was	 achieved	very	 early	on,	 at	mini-
mum	marketing	and	communication	cost.
The lack of solid patent protection (except for the US) 
did not hurt Bayer in the early days of commercialization of 
Aspirin as the company kept building technological assets 
that served as entry barriers: Bayer developed specific 
manufacturing capabilities essentially protected by secrecy 
on know how (scale and efficiency of production processes; 
ability to press tablets despite ASA instability). Note that 
these efforts to build proprietary process knowledge were 
triggered not by competitors (in Porter’s rivalry sense) but 
instead by distributors that made inadequate use of the 
product. Conversely the existence of a trademark very early 
on made it possible to start building a brand at basically 
no cost, by simply adding the Aspirin name on the tablets 
and benefitting from the press coverage of the epidemics. 
One could argue that the boosting effect of epidemics was 
contingent – and so it was. But the fundamental ingredients 
needed to benefit from the contingency happened to be in 
place. (Sometimes luck is in fact well deserved).
• A	strong	position	until	1914
All	 in	 all,	 Hoffmann’s	 invention	 allowed	 for	 a	 large-
scale	production	of	ASA	and	thus	the	treatment	of	patients	
suffering	 from	 rheumatism,	headaches	or	 even	 inflamma-
tion.	 The	 drug	 was	 very	 effective,	 with	 low	 side	 effects	

























trademark	on	this	name.”	(Mann & Plummer, 1991).
We clearly see here some form of two-way complemen-
tarities that appeared very early on between proprietary 
technologies and brand equity in extracting value from an 
innovation. More specifically, the case suggests three inter-
esting elements. Firstly, the brand name was established in 
a few years time thanks to technological assets: it is tech-
nology, via technological innovation, that made it possible 
to file a trade-mark. Secondly, the brand-name appearing 
on the tablets turned out to support Bayer’s technological 
answer (tablets) against the misuse (dilution) of the product 
by some distributors (druggists). This means that the brand-
name complemented the purely technological protection 
of the product (tablet form and manufacturing process). 
Thirdly, the dynamics of the story shows that the building 
of the Aspirin brand did not cost much to Bayer. Everything 
worked as if filing a trade-mark very early on meant putting 
the brand in a position to piggyback the dynamics of mar-
ket penetration associated to technological assets (product 
superior performance and specific manufacturing capabili-
ties). This also worked to access distribution networks. In 
this sense, the story that unfolds is not a sequence of a tech-
nological innovation followed by the emergence of a global 
brand and the control of distribution channels. Instead, it 
is a story of an innovation combining two facets: a tech-
nological achievement put to the market, and the parallel 
building of distribution channels and the emergence of a 
brand. In addition, the combination works dynamically and 
almost simultaneously: the technology starts and immedi-
ately after the marketing side comes in to both benefit from 





a	 patent	 except	 in	 the	 US).	 In	 early	 1914,	 the	 company	
launched	 an	 advertisement	 campaign	 promoting	 its	 prod-
ucts	directly	to	end-consumers,	hoping	to	further	increase	
consumers’	 familiarity	 with	 the	 Bayer	 name,	 reinforce	









We see here a more classical move. When the protection 
via the technological assets is about to expire, companies 
tend to turn to the market-based assets. While the initial 
building of the Aspirin brand name had not required heavy 
communication investments, Bayer was finally deciding 
to start investing in the brand. However, at that stage the 
4.	 All	 the	 advertisements	 contained	 the	 following	 sentence:	 “The	
Trade-Mark	 ‘Aspirin’	 (Reg.	 U.S.	 Pat.	 Off.)	 is	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	
monoacetic	acid	ester	of	salicylic	acid	in	these	tablets	is	of	the	reliable	
Bayer	manufacture.”	McTavish,	J.	R.	(1987),	p.	357.
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brand recognition was already largely established and the 
investments that started in 1914 were essentially needed to 
reinforce and maintain the brand (and thus reinforce the 
distribution channels). Adopting a counterfactual perspec-
tive, one could imagine that building a brand from scratch 
at that point would most certainly have cost much more. 
In any case, the outbreak of WWI did not permit to pursue 
such investments. 
• Bayer	AG	loses	some	of	its	right
On	 December	 12,	 1918,	 just	 a	 few	 weeks	 after	 the	
armistice	 of	 November	 1918,	 the	 APC	 (Alien	 Property	
Custodian	 act)	 auctioned	 Bayer	 Corporation’s	 properties	














of	Bayer	 into	 the	Winthrop	Chemical	Company	 that	 sub-















appeared	 to	become	a	 form	of	 technological	mirage.	The	
previous	German	supervisors	and	managers	of	the	plant	had	
been	jailed	or	sent	away	so	that	nobody	knew	how	to	run	the	
machines	 or	 operate	 the	 facilities	 efficiently.	 In	 addition,	
Sterling’s	employees	could	not	understand	Bayer’s	patent	
documents.	 These	 were	 supposed	 to	 explain	 Hoffmann’s	
production	process	of	ASA	but	were	perceived	by	chem-
ists	as	a	marvel	“of	obfuscation”	(Mann	&	Plummer,	1991).	




This tends to suggest a significant difference between 
technology-based and market-based assets when it comes 
to acquisition. While market-based assets may be controlled 
by property rights, the case study confirms that technology-
based assets may be socially embedded in an organization 
and in some of its key people. The real protection offered by 
the technological assets came from the proprietary knowl-
edge of manufacturing processes, not from the ownership 
of the manufacturing facilities, nor from the patent (the US 










tion,	Sterling	 transferred	back	 to	Bayer	AG	 its	 trademark	
rights	for	Latin	America.	In	return,	Bayer	AG	was	to	bring	
technical	assistance	to	Sterling	in	producing	ASA.	In	other	






















to	give	Sterling	continued	 technical	 assistance	 in	produc-
ing	Aspirin	for	the	US	market	in	return	for	half	of	the	US	
profits.
These episodes illustrate the vulnerability of brands 
when faced to legal decisions in court. They also give an 
indication of the bargaining power attached to intangible 
technological assets (in this case proprietary manufactur-
ing know-how). Bayer AG was leveraging its technological 
know-how, giving away some technological assistance to 
regain market-based assets. This does not suggest that the 
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two types of assets are substitutable. However they clearly 









Around	 1949,	 Bayer	 AG	 re-launched	 an	 advertising	
campaign	 for	 the	Bayer	Aspirin	 in	 those	 countries	where	
they	had	not	lost	their	rights,	especially	in	Germany.	Bayer	
AG	also	 tried	 to	 regain	ownership	on	 international	 trade-
mark	rights	attached	to	the	Bayer	and	Aspirin	names.	They	





In	 the	 meantime,	 several	 new	 brands	 of	 ASA	 had	
appeared	 on	 the	 US	 market	 (e.g.	 Anacin,	 Bufferin	 or	
Tylenol),	 claiming	 product	 superiority	 over	 Aspirin	 via	
communication.	 (Anacin	 advertisement	 budget	 amounted	
to	some	US$	15	million	in	the	mid	1950s).	In	some	other	
countries,	e.g.,	France	or	the	UK,	new	analgesics	based	on	
acetaminophen	 were	 successfully	 marketed,	 claiming	 no	
gastrointestinal	 bleeding	 and	 no	 upset	 stomachs5.	During	




In	 1970,	 Bayer	AG	 negotiated	 with	 Sterling	 the	 pur-




kept	 trying	 to	 improve	 the	 product	 via	 some	 incremental	
innovations,	 e.g.	 new	 tablets	 with	 vitamin	 C,	 faster	 pain	
releasing	effect	and	increased	tolerance.	Later	these	efforts	
also	 led	 to	 effervescent	 tablets,	 chewable	 tablets	 or	 the	
twin-packaged	ASA	tablets	for	the	treatment	of	migraine.
This lengthy battle between Sterling and Bayer suggests 
that intellectual property rights can lure players away from 
the heart of competition. It also shows how the focus shifted 
from a technological asset perspective to an issue around 
market-based assets. Proprietary technologies were no 
longer the main concern at this stage. Instead, trademarks, 
logos, a global brand and the control of distribution chan-
nels were the focus of attention. Yet, the company kept work-
ing on improving the technological assets via innovation. In 
other words, it is not “either technology or market based 
assets”. It is both. There was a major focus on brand at that 
point, but technological innovation remained on the agenda 






of	 apoplexy.	 In	 1982	Prof.	Vane	 of	 the	Royal	 Physicians	










volunteers,	 fifty	 percent	 being	 treated	with	 325	mg	ASA	

















We see the successful ending of decades of effort by 
Bayer to regain control of market-based assets (trade-
name, brand, logo and to some extent distribution chan-
nels). But we also see continuous attention being paid to 
maintaining the technology assets and improving the prod-
uct via innovation. And when a good surprise comes, when 
ASA is found to prevent heart attacks -contingency again-, 
the company is ready for it because it stayed on the move, 
keen to leverage its technological asset base.
5.	 The	advertisement	campaigns	were	so	successful	that	the	marketing	
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• The	Lipobay	and	anthrax	crises
Business	 life,	 however,	 can	 also	 bring	 bad	 surprises.	
During	 the	 summer	2001,	 one	of	Bayer’s	 pharmaceutical	
products,	Lipobay,	 had	 to	 be	withdrawn	 from	 the	market	
after	losing	market	approval	due	to	concerns	about	undesir-
able	 strong	 side	effects.	This	 severely	damaged	 the	 repu-
tation	of	Bayer	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	and	 it	had	
a	considerable	negative	impact	on	Bayer’s	reputation	as	a	
whole	and	on	the	company	value.	The	Bayer	Lipobay	scan-
dal	 even	 reached	 the	point	where	Bayer	 thought	 of	 com-
pletely	 selling	 its	 pharmaceutical	 division.	 However,	 the	
anthrax	crisis	broke	out	at	about	the	same	time.	Bayer	was	
the	only	pharmaceutical	company	able	 to	readily	offer	an	
effective	 anti-anthrax	 drug:	 the	 Ciprobay.	 This	 saved	 the	
pharmaceutical	division.	
This tends to suggest another significant difference 
between technology-based and market-based assets. The 
Lipobay incident show how vulnerable a brand can be in 
a Hi-tech sector such as the drug industry. In addition, it 
shows how risky it may be to use corporate brands for spe-
cific products when product-related isolated incidents can 
have considerable influence on the general reputation of the 
company. In other words, while showing the importance of 
market-based assets in the second part of the life of a tech-
nological innovation, the case suggests the extreme vulner-
ability of the brand. (After decades of efforts to recapture 
brand control, Bayer came close to abandoning its phar-
maceutical activities!) In contrast one may hypothesize that 






products.	 The	 market	 of	 analgesics,	 fever	 and	 infection	






The	 resulting	 effect	 of	 these	 diverging	 evolutions	 has	
been	 for	ASA	 production	 a	 continuous	 increase	 over	 the	
years	to	an	estimated	40,000	tons	of	ASA	produced	world-













Tylenol.	 (The	main	 sales	 of	Tylenol	 stem	primarily	 from	
the	US	market	that	accounts	for	approximately	35	to	40%	
of	worldwide	 analgesic	 sales).	 In	 a	 few	 countries,	 Bayer	
was	able	to	uphold	its	dominant	position	over	the	last	100	
years	 even	 though	 patent	 protection	 was	 never	 in	 place,	
while	production	processes	were	broadly	known	and	could	
be	readily	imitated.	
We could find a variety of reasons to explain the resil-
ience of Bayer on the Aspirin market. For example, one 
could argue that being the innovator, Bayer benefited from 
initial dominant market shares that led to substantial learn-
ing curve effects which subsequently reduced production 
cost, improved product quality, and permitted new incre-
mental innovation. But could that explain market lead-
ership a century later? Instead, the core argument that 
emerges from our reading of the case is the complemntary 
role played by both the technology-based and the market-
based assets. 
• Perception	of	innovation	according	to	markets
The	 footprint	 of	 the	 bumpy	 history	 of	 Bayer	Aspirin	
remains	 apparent	 today,	 that	 is	 several	 decades	 later.	 In	
those	countries	where	Bayer	Aspirin	has	been	permanently	
present	over	the	entire	100	year	period	and/or	where	Bayer	
more	or	 less	continuously	held	 its	exclusive	rights	on	 the	
trademark	Aspirin,	 e.g.,	 Germany,	 Spain,	 Italy,	 and	most	










where	 the	 legal	 quarrels	 between	 Sterling	 and	Bayer	AG	
prevented	proper	brand	management,	Bayer’s	position	on	
Aspirin	products	 is	considerably	weaker.	Finally,	 in	 those	
national	 markets	 such	 as	 France	 and	 its	 former	 colonies	
where	the	Bayer	Aspirin	brand	was	not	present	at	all	over	a	
period	of	several	years,	consumers	have	become	acquainted	
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In	this	context,	an	interesting	feature	of	the	Aspirin	case	





ness	 for	 specific	 treatments,	 facilitating	 dosage	 and	 use,	
or	more	recently	addressing	 the	new	indications	for	heart	











tive,	 and	 innovative	 pharmaceutical.	 Again,	 the	 various	
Aspirin	product	sold	by	Bayer	AG	on	both	zones	are	basi-
cally	the	same.	
We argue that the bumpy history of the Bayer Aspirin 
provide us with a peculiar lab-like experiment, where sev-
eral markets happened to be addressed (or covered) dif-
ferently over the years due to the 20th century wars. Now 
that these markets are all addressable in the same way, 
with basically the same product range, we can observe the 
consequences of the differences in market-based assets. 
More specifically, our reading of the case study suggests 
that differences in marketing, brand management and cus-
tomer relations can yield significant differences in the con-
sumers’ perception of technological innovations around 
the product. (In turn this leads to significant differences 
in market performance). This is another indication of the 
intricate complementarities and mutual interdependencies 
that bound together market-related and technology-related 
assets.
Recapitulating and discussing the key findings
Let	us	recapitulate	our	key	findings.	We	saw	a	typical	tech-
nological	 innovation	 (ASA)	 that	 called	 upon	 knowledge	
gathered	from	the	outside	combined	with	internal	develop-
ment	capabilities.	We	saw	how	Bayer	almost	immediately	
filed	 a	 trademark	 ‘Aspirin’,	 while	 building	 specific	 tech-








of	 its	markets,	 before	 finally	 regaining	 full	 control	 of	 its	
brand	and	market	access.	We	also	saw	that	during	all	these	












The	 study	 also	 suggests	 strong	 interdependencies	




nological	knowledge	which	 translated	 into	 superior	prod-
uct	 offerings	 and	more	 efficient	 production	 processes.	 In	
that	first	phase,	Bayer	AG	was	in	a	position	to	rapidly	build	
strong	brand	equity	around	 its	 trademark	‘Aspirin’	due	 to	
the	 unique	 advantages	 of	 its	 ASA	 product	 compared	 to	
competing	 substances.	 Although	 Bayer	 did	 not	 initially	
advertise	 its	 drug	 directly	 to	 the	 public,	 the	 trademark	
quickly	achieved	significant	notoriety	among	patients	and	
the	medical	community.	In	a	second	phase,	the	brand-name	
and	 the	 logo	 could	 combine	with	 the	 tablet	 form	 to	 pro-
tect	 Bayer	 against	misbehaviour	 by	 some	 druggists,	 thus	






decades	 ahead,	 simply	 by	 surfing	 the	wave	 generated	 by	
the	press	coverage	of	the	influenza.	At	that	stage,	technol-









the	1914	 launch	of	an	advertising	campaign	 in	 the	US	 to	
consolidate	the	brand.	
The	 sequence	 that	 we	 summarized	 so	 far	 suggests	 a	
typical	linear	dynamics	in	the	complementarities	over	time	
between	technology-based	and	market-based	assets	in	their	
relative	 role	 to	 protect	 a	 rent.	 First	 Technology.	 Second,	
Technology	and	brand.	Third,	this	technology	and	brand	on	
equal	footage,	and	soon	after	technology	and	Brand.	Fourth	
the	Brand	only,	when	 radical	 innovation	 strikes,	meaning	
that	 the	 technology-based	 assets	 would	 have	 to	 be	 fully	





ents	 a	 summary	of	 the	events	 and	 features	of	 the	Aspirin	
case.
Due	to	the	wars,	as	we	have	seen,	the	Bayer	case	study	












to	keep	 investing	 in	 technology	development	and	 innova-
tive	activities.	We	argue	that	this	continuous	attention	paid	
to	 technology	 subsequently	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 helping	
Bayer	capture	the	benefits	of	the	discovery	of	ASA’s	effects	
on	heart	 diseases	 (Cardio	 representing	 today	 almost	 40%	
of	Aspirin	 sales	at	Bayer).	This	 suggests	 that	 the	 relation	
between	 technology-based	and	market-based	assets	 is	not	
an	“either-or”,	nor	a	“first	technology,	then	brand”.	Instead,	














ers	 from	 various	market	 zones	 today	 perceive	 differently	




Key Events and Features of the Aspirin Case study
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the	 history	 of	 the	 relation	 that	 the	Bayer	 brand	 had	with	
these	market	zones.	This	suggests	how	intricate	the	mutual	
interdpendencies	 between	 market-based	 and	 technology-





complementarities	 run	 throughout	 the	 whole	 technology	
life-cycle	to	protect	the	rent	extraction.	In	addition,	a	shift	
in	 the	 centre	 of	 gravity	 (between	 technology-based	 and	













history	of	 the	Bayer	Aspirin	may	 fall	outside	 the	compe-
tence	of	most	Bayer	managers,	except	for	company	urban	
myths	 typically	 conveyed	 by	 public	 relations.	 External	
validity	 cannot	 be	 covered,	 nor	 claimed,	 in	 a	 single	 case	







to	 focus	 upon.	By	 construction,	 it	 cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	
anything	more	than	a	proposal	at	this	stage.	
This	 analysis	 suggests	 potential	 managerial	 implica-
tions.	One,	it	may	be	wise	for	Hi-tech	start-ups	to	consider	
planting	 the	 seeds	 for	market-based	 assets	 very	 early	 on	
(brand-names,	 logo,	 etc.).	This	may	 not	 be	 their	 priority.	
Yet,	they	may	find	it	an	efficient	way	to	build	market-based	
assets	 at	 minimal	 cost.	 Second,	 at	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	
spectrum,	when	 radical	 innovation	 strikes	 to	 sweep	most	
technology	 assets	 away,	 one	 may	 use	 the	 market	 assets	
as	 a	 shield	 that	may	help	bridge	 the	gap	 to	 reach	out	 for	
the	 new	 technological	 trajectory.	 Third,	 in	 between	 the	
start	and	the	end	of	the	technology	cycle	-	even	after	most	




















Our	aim	 in	 this	paper	was	 to	understand	how	some	com-
panies	manage	to	keep	extracting	rents	from	technological	
innovation	 long	 after	 the	 technology	 (patents,	 manufac-
turing	 know-how)	 has	 fallen	 into	 the	 public	 domain.	We	
suspected	 that	 market-based	 assets	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	
complementing	 the	 technology-based	 assets.	 We	 aimed	
at	finding	empirical	 indications	of	 this	 role.	 (In	doing	so,	
we	 aimed	 at	 bridging	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 where	 both	
patents	 and	brands	 are	dealt	with	 in	depth,	 but	mostly	 in	
silos	 as	 if	 they	were	 fully	 independent	modes	 of	 protec-
tion).	Furthermore,	we	aimed	at	gaining	some	preliminary	





R&D	 investments.	 The	 brand	 equity	 established	 around	
the	product	name	Aspirin	enabled	Bayer	AG	 to	dominate	
the	 analgesic	 market	 over	 an	 impressive	 period	 of	 more	
than	100	years.	Furthermore,	 the	discussion	suggests	 that	
brand	 equity	 is	most	 easily	 built	 by	 the	 innovator,	 as	 the	
market-based	assets	piggyback	the	initial	advantage	stem-
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